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Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast na-
ture of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism
design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing conver-
gence of specific pre-designed learning dynamics, rather than for a class of learning
dynamics. In this paper we consider two common resource allocation problems:
sharing K infinitely divisible resources among strategic agents for their private
consumption (private goods), and determining the level for an infinitely divisible
public good with P features, that is shared between strategic agents. For both
cases, we present a distributed mechanism for a set of agents who communicate
through a given network. In a distributed mechanism, agents’ messages are not
broadcast to all other agents as in the standard mechanism design framework,
but are exchanged only in the local neighborhood of each agent. The presented
mechanisms produce a unique NE and fully implement the social welfare maxi-
mizing allocation. In addition, the mechanisms are budget-balanced at NE. It is
also shown that the mechanisms induce a game with contractive best-response,
leading to guaranteed convergence for all learning dynamics within the Adaptive
Best-Response dynamics class, including dynamics such as Cournot best-response,
k period best-response and Fictitious Play. We also present a numerically study
of convergence under repeated play, for various communication graphs and learn-
ing dynamics.
∗This work is supported in part by NSF grant ECCS-1608361.
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1. Introduction
Mechanism design has been studied extensively in Economics [1, 2, 3] and Engineering liter-
ature [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Most of the mechanisms presented in literature for the case of
strategic agents have two (unrelated) drawbacks that are an impediment to their applicability
in real-world scenarios. The first drawback is the assumption that the underlying communi-
cation structure between agents is a broadcast one. Almost all mechanisms in the strategic
setting define allocation (and taxes/subsidies) in such a way that it requires each agent to
broadcast their message, i.e., the allocation function is a function of all users’ messages. The
second drawback is the dynamic stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game induced by
the mechanism. Results on this, for most of the presented mechanisms in the literature, are
either non-existent or restricted to narrow definition(s) of dynamic stability. As a result it
is not clear if, and under what conditions on the dynamics, the NE is reached.
Regarding the first issue mentioned above, until now little consideration has been given to
designing incentives for strategic agents for whom communication is restricted by a network.
The motivation for this modeling consideration comes from the literature on distributed
optimization, [12, 13, 14, 15], where algorithms are designed for global consensus between
distributed non-strategic agents, who possess local information and who communicate locally
on a network. In mechanism design, a designer designs incentives such that strategic agents
“agree” to reveal their relevant private (local) information truthfully. Thus, with the above
motivation in mind, a natural question is to ask: can incentives be designed for strategic
agents with local private information who communicate locally on a network? One expects
that attaining consensus between strategic agents only becomes harder to achieve when
message exchange is restricted by the network structure. This aforementioned issue is not
to be confused with that of distributed optimization where the problem of local exchange of
information has been addressed and to a large extend solved [12, 13, 14, 15]. Neither should
it be confused with the local public goods models (e.g., [16, 17]), where each agent’s utility
in the model is already assumed to only depend on his/her neighbors’ allocations.
Regarding the second drawback mentioned above, there is a long line of work investigating
stability of NE through learning in games [18, 19, 20]. Theoretically, the notion of NE applies
to perfect information settings, i.e., where each agent knows the utility of every other agent.
However, for most of the mechanism design works in the literature where NE is used as the
solution concept, the models are not necessarily restricted to the perfect information setting.
Indeed, in an informationally and physically decentralized system it is natural to assume
that agents only know their own utility and no one else’s. In such cases, the robustness
w.r.t. information available to agents, of any particular designed mechanism is evaluated
by the learning guarantees that it can provide. Since agents can’t calculate the NE offline,
they are expected to learn it by repeatedly playing the induced game whilst adjusting their
strategy dynamically using the past observations. The larger the class of learning dynamics
that are guaranteed to converge, the more robust the mechanism. The idea of NE being
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the convergent point of learning dynamics directly relates to the Evolutive interpretation of
NE, [21], where NE even for a single-shot game is interpreted as the stationary point of a
dynamic adjustment process. The original thesis of John Nash, [22], too provides a similar
dynamic adjustment interpretation of NE.
In this paper our objective is to design mechanisms that resolve simultaneously both the
issues mentioned above. This means that the mechanisms are distributed, i.e., the allocation
and tax functions (contracts) obey the communication constraints of a network and for the
designed mechanisms theoretical guarantees of convergence, for a sufficiently large class of
learning dynamics, can be provided.
The basic idea for achieving the latter this is to identify appropriate properties of games
that can lead to convergence of a correspondingly selected class of learning dynamics and
then design the mechanism such that the induced game possesses the identified properties. In
Milgrom and Roberts [18], authors identify supermodularity as a critical property of a game
and prove that any learning dynamic within the Adaptive Dynamics class is guaranteed to
converge between the two most extreme Nash equilibria when the game is played repeatedly.
Following this, [23] presents a mechanism for the Lindahl allocation problem such that the
induced game is supermodular. Healy and Mathevet in [24] identify contraction as a learning-
relevant property of the game and show that any learning dynamic within the Adaptive
Best-Response (ABR) dynamics class is guaranteed to converge to the unique NE. They also
present a mechanism that induces a contractive game for the Walrasian and Lindahl allocation
problems, under the usual broadcast information structure. The property of contraction is
more stringent than supermodularity and consequently the ABR class is broader than the
Adaptive Dynamics class.
In this paper, for both Walrasian and Lindahl allocation problems, we define a mechanism
through an appropriately designed message space, allocation function and tax function. The
allocation and tax functions, for any agent, depend only on the messages of his/her neighbors.
The mechanism description contains certain free parameters such that for all values of these
parameters the mechanism achieves its goal of full implementation in NE. For the purpose
of providing learning guarantees we consider the ABR class of learning dynamics and show
that by tuning the free parameters appropriately, the induced game can be made contractive.
Section 5 describes some well-known learning dynamics that are part of the ABR class. With
the aid of numerical analysis, we show that the designed contractive mechanism provides
exponential rate of convergence for several instances of our model.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the two centralized allocation
problems and their optimality conditions. Section 3 defines some mechanism design basics
and then presents the mechanism for the private goods problem. Section 4 presents the
mechanism for the public goods problem. Section 5 introduces learning-related properties
and contains the result of guaranteed convergence of any learning dynamic within the ABR
class. Finally, Section 5 also contains a numerical study of the convergence pattern of various
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learning dynamics for different underlying communication graphs.
2. Model
There are N strategic agents, denoted by the set N = f1; : : : ; Ng. A directed communication
graph G = (N;E) is given, where the vertexes correspond to the agents and an edge from
vertex i to j indicates that agent i can “listen” to agent j. It is assumed that the given graph
G is strongly connected. In this paper, we are interested in two different types of allocation
problems: private goods and public goods, we describe each model below. In Economics
literature, these are also known as Walrasian and Lindahl allocation problems [25, 26].
2.1. Private goods allocation problem
There are K infinitely divisible goods, denoted by set K = f1; : : : ; Kg, that are to be
distributed among the agents. Each agent receives a utility v
i
(x
i
) based on the profile
x
i
= (x
1
i
; : : : ; x
K
i
) of quantity of each good that he/she receives. Since for each agent, its
utility depends only on privately consumed allocation x
i
and not on other agents’ allocation,
this is the private goods model.
It is assumed that v
i
: R
K
! R is a continuously double-differentiable, strictly concave
function that satisfies, 8 k 2 K,
  < H
 1
kk
+
X
l2K; l6=k


H
 1
kl


< 0; (1a)
H
 1
kk
<  
1

; (1b)
for any given  > 1, where H 1 is the inverse of the Hessian H =

(
2
v
i
())
Æ
(x
k
i
x
l
i
)

k;l
.
To understand the significance of this assumption consider the case of K = 1, then this
condition is the same as
v
00
i
() 2

 ; 
1


: (2)
It is already assumed that v
i
() is strictly concave, the only additional imposition made by
this assumption is that the second derivative of v
i
() is strictly bounded away from 0 and
 1. More generally if the utility is separable, v
i
(x
i
) =
P
k2K
v
i;k
(x
k
i
), then the condition
in (1) is the same as
v
00
i;k
() 2

 ; 
1


; 8 k 2 K: (3)
The above mentioned properties of the utility function are assumed to be common knowledge
between agents and the designer. However, the utility function v
i
() itself is known only to
agent i and is not known to other agents or the designer. The designer wishes to allocate
4
available goods such that the sum of utilities is maximized subject to availability constraints,
i.e., to solve the following centralized allocation problem,
x

= argmax
x2R
K
X
i2N
v
i
(x
i
) (4a)
subject to
X
i2N
x
k
i
= 
k
; 8 k 2 K; (4b)
where 
k
2 R is the total available amount of good k 2 K. The allocation x is also called the
efficient allocation and it is assumed to be finite i.e., the optimization is well-defined. The
efficient allocation is unique since the utilities are strictly concave. Further, the necessary
and sufficient condition for optimality are
v
i
(x

)
x
k
i
= 

k
; 8 k 2 K; 8 i 2 N; (5a)
X
i2N
x
k
i

= 
k
; 8 k 2 K; (5b)
where
 


k

k2K
2 R
K are the (unique) optimal dual variables for each constraint in (4b).
2.2. Public goods allocation problem
There is a single infinitely divisible public good with P features, with the set of features
denoted by P = f1; : : : ; Pg. Each agent receives a utility v
i
(x) based on the quantity of the
public good x = (xp)
p2P
2 R
P . Since for each agent, its utility depends on the common
allocation x, this is the public goods model. It is assumed that v
i
: R
P
! R is a con-
tinuously double-differentiable, strictly concave function that satisfies (1) with the Hessian
H = [(
2
v
i
())/(x
p
x
q
)℄
p;q
. If P = 1, then this condition is the same as in (2). As in the
private goods model, the properties of the utility function are assumed to be common knowl-
edge between agents and the designer. However, the utility function v
i
() itself is known only
to agent i and is not known to other agents or the designer. The designer wishes to allo-
cate the public good such that the sum of utilities is maximized, i.e., to solve the following
centralized allocation problem,
x

= argmax
x2R
P
X
i2N
v
i
(x): (6)
The allocation x is also called the efficient allocation and it is assumed to be finite i.e.,
the optimization is well-defined. The efficient allocation is unique due to strictly concave
utilities. The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions can be written as
v
i
(x

)
x
p
= 
p
i

; 8 p 2 P; 8 i 2 N; (7a)
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Xi2N

p
i

= 0; 8 p 2 P; (7b)
where
 

p
i


p2P;i2N
are the (unique) optimal dual variables.
In general, for the public goods problem one can also assume a seller in the system who
produces the quantity x and for whom the cost of production is a known (convex) function.
In this case, the social welfare maximizing allocation contains the utility of the seller as well.
For keeping exposition clear and to focus on the similarities between the public and private
goods problems, the seller is not considered in this model. If needed, this can accommodated
in a straightforward manner.
In the next two sections, we present a mechanism for each of the above problems.
3. A mechanism for the private goods problem
3.1. Definitions
A one-shot mechanism is defined by the triplet,

M = M
1
    M
N
;
 
bx
1
(); : : : ; bx
N
()

;
 
b
t
1
(); : : : ;
b
t
N
()


(8)
which consists of, for each agent i 2 N, the message space M
i
, the allocation function
bx
i
: M ! RK and the tax function bt
i
: M ! R. Given a mechanism, a game G
pvt
is setup
between the agents in N, with action space M and utilities
u
i
(m) = v
i
(bx
i
(m)) 
b
t
i
(m): (9)
For this game, em 2M is a Nash equilibrium if
u
i
( em)  u
i
(m
i
; em
 i
); 8 m
i
2M
i
; 8 i 2 N: (10)
The mechanism is said to fully implement the efficient allocation if

bx
1
( em); : : : ; bx
N
( em)

= x

; 8 em 2M
NE
; (11)
where M
NE
M is the set of all Nash equilibria of game G
pvt
and x is the efficient allocation
from (4). Furthermore, the mechanism is said to be budget balanced at Nash equilibrium if
X
i2N
b
t
i
( em) = 0; 8 em 2M
NE
: (12)
Finally, we call the mechanism distributed if for any agent i 2 N, the allocation function
bx
i
() and tax function bt
i
() instead of depending on the entire message m = (m
j
)
j2N, depend
only on m
i
and
 
m
j

j2N(i)
, i.e., agent i and his/her immediate neighbors. Here N(i) are all
the “out”-neighbors of i i.e., there exists an edge from i to j in graph G iff j 2 N(i) .
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Figure 1: n(i; j) and d(i; j) for the strongly connected directed graph G.
3.2. Mechanism
For the purpose of maintaining clarity in the exposition, the mechanism presented below is
for the special case of a single private good i.e., K = 1. A natural extension of the presented
mechanism to the general case is discussed at the end of this section.
For any agent i 2 N, the message space is M
i
= R
N+1 . The message m
i
= (y
i
; q
i
) consists
of agent i’s demand y
i
2 R for the allocation of the single good and a surrogate/proxy
q
i
=
 
q
1
i
; : : : ; q
N
i

2 R
N for the demand of all the agents (including himself/herself).
Since the underlying graph G = (N;E) is strongly connected, for any pair of vertexes
i; j 2 N, the following two quantities are well-defined. d(i; j) is the length of the shortest
path from i to j and n(i; j) 2 N(i) is the out-neighbor of i such that the shortest path from i
to j goes through n(i; j). The two quantities are depicted in Fig. 1. The allocation function
is defined as
bx
i
(m) = y
i
 
1
N   1
X
r2N(i)
q
r
r

 
1
N   1
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
q
r
n(i;r)

d(i;r) 1
+

1
N
; 8 i 2 N; (13)
where  2 (0; 1) is an appropriately chosen contraction parameter and its selection is dis-
cussed in Section 5 on Learning Guarantees, proof of Proposition 3. The tax function is
defined as
b
t
i
(m) = bp
i
(m
 i
)

bx
i
(m) 

1
N

+
 
q
i
i
  y
i

2
+
X
r2N(i)
(q
r
i
  y
r
)
2
+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
 
q
r
i
  q
r
n(i;r)

2
;
(14a)
bp
i
(m
 i
) =
1
Æ
0
B
B

q
i
n(i;i)

+
X
r2N(i)
q
r
r

+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
q
r
n(i;r)

d(i;r) 1
1
C
C
A
; 8 i 2 N; (14b)
where n(i; i) 2 N(i) is an arbitrarily chosen neighbor of i and Æ > 0 is an appropriately
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chosen parameter. Both ; Æ are selected simultaneously in the proof of Proposition 3 from
Section 5.
The quantities, n(; ) and d(; ), are based on the graph G. The only property of relevance
here is that the two are related recursively i.e., d(n(i; r); r) = d(i; r) 1. Thus if a mechanism
designer wishes to avoid calculating the shortest path (possibly due to the high complexity)
then n; d can be replaced by any valid neighbor and distance mapping, respectively, as long
as they are related recursively as above.
3.3. Results
Fact 1 (Distributed). The mechanism defined in (13) and (14) is distributed.
The distributed-ness of the mechanism follows from the fact that the expressions in (13)
and (14) depend only on m
i
and
 
m
r

r2N(i)
.
Since agents are connected through a given graph, they can only communicate with a
restricted set of agents i.e., their neighbors. Yet, as indicated in the optimality conditions, (5),
there needs to be two kinds of global consensus at the efficient allocation. Firstly, the total
allocation to all the agents must equal the total available amount,
P
i2N
x

i
= 
1
. Secondly,
agents also need to agree on a common “price”, 
1
. To facilitate this, the message space
consists of the surrogate variables q
i
= (q
1
i
; : : : ; q
N
i
) which are known locally to agent i
and are expected at equilibrium to be representative of the global demand y = (y
1
; : : : ; y
N
).
Specifically, the second, third and fourth terms in the tax, (14a), are designed for incentivizing
agents to achieve the aforementioned duplication of global demand y to the local surrogate
q
i
.
To motivate the choice of the allocation function and the remaining part of the tax function
consider the case of  = 1 and take into account the duplication, i.e., q
r
= y, 8 r 2 N. Since
 = 1, all the factors involving  become 1 for the expressions in (13) and (14). We design
the allocation bx
i
(m) as a function of y
i
and (q
r
)
r2N(i)
such that after taking into account
the duplication it becomes y
i
 
1
N 1
P
j 6=i
y
j
+

1
N
. This facilitates the first global consensus,
P
i2N
x
i
= 
1
. One standard design principle for mechanisms is that if an agent partially
controls their own allocation (such as here, since bx
i
(m) depends on y
i
) then they shouldn’t
be able to control the price. This is the reason that bp
i
() doesn’t depend on m
i
. It is function
of (q
r
)
r2N(i)
and is designed such that after taking into account the duplication, the price for
any agent is proportional to
P
j
y
j
. This facilitates the second consensus - common price for
all agents.
Finally, we set  < 1 and adjust the allocation and tax function accordingly so that the
game G
pvt
can be contractive (see Section 5).
Before proceeding to the main results, define the best-response of any agent i,

i
(m
 i
) =
 
~y
i
(m
 i
); ~q
i
(m
 i
)

, argmax
m
i
2M
i
u
i
(m): (15)
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Denote  = (
1
; : : : ; 
N
). Best-response  : M!M is a set-valued function in general.
Lemma 1 (Concavity). For any agent i 2 N and m
 i
2 M
 i
, the utility u
i
(m), defined
in (9), for the game G
pvt
is strictly concave in m
i
= (y
i
; q
i
). Thus, the best-response of
agent i is unique and is defined by the first order conditions.
Proof. Please see Appendix A. 
Concavity of the induced utility in the game G
pvt
largely follows from the tax terms
being quadratic. The second tax term in (14a) is the only source of cross derivatives across
components of message m
i
. Concavity is proved by verifying that the Hessian matrix is
negative definite.
Proposition 1 (Full Implementation and Budget Balance). For the game G
pvt
, there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium, em 2M, and the allocation at Nash equilibrium is efficient,
i.e., bx
i
( em) = x

i
, 8 i 2 N. Further, the total tax paid at Nash equilibrium em is zero, i.e.,
X
i2N
b
t
i
( em) = 0: (16)
Proof. Please see Appendix B. 
The proof of Proposition 1 can be intuitively explained as follows. Since the optimality
conditions in (5) are sufficient, we start by showing that at any Nash equilibrium the al-
location and price necessarily satisfy the optimality conditions. Thereby ensuring that if
Nash equilibrium exists (unique or multiple) the corresponding allocation is efficient. Then
we show existence and uniqueness by showing a one-to-one map between message at Nash
equilibrium and (x; ) arising out of the optimization in (4).
Generalizing to multiple goods (K > 1)
For the general problem we use notation on a per good basis. The message space is,
M
i
= 
k2K
Mk
i
= 
k2K
R
(N+1)
= R
(N+1)K
: (17)
Any message m
i
=
 
m
k
i

k2K
= (y
i
; q
i
) contains separate demands and proxies for each good
k 2 K. Denote it as follows
y
i
=
 
y
k
i

k2K
2 R
K
; (18a)
q
i
=
 
q
r;k
i

r2N;k2K
2 R
NK
; (18b)
where for any good k 2 K, demand and proxies
 
y
k
i
; (q
r;k
i
)
r2N

2 R
N+1 have the same inter-
pretation as (y
i
; q
i
) in the presented mechanism above with only one good. The allocation
function is bxk
i
(), for any i 2 N, k 2 K and the tax function is
b
t
i
() =
X
k2K
b
t
k
i
(m); 8 i 2 N: (19)
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Here both functions bxk
i
() and bt k
i
(), depend only on mk, the part of message m pertaining
to good k. The expression for both functions are the same as in the presented mechanism
above, (13) and (14), replacing m by mk.
The generalized mechanism is distributed as well, since all allocation and tax functions
still depend only on message of the agent and that of its neighbors. Owing to the design
with a good-wise separation, the utility has the following form
u
i
(m) = v
i

 
bx
k
i
(m
k
)

k2K

 
X
k2K
b
t
k
i
(m
k
): (20)
Concavity of u
i
follows from arguments similar to Proposition 1, where we verify the Hessian
to be negative definite. Since the optimality conditions in (5) are sufficient, the properties of
efficiency, existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium follow from the first order conditions
for optimality in the best-response. Finally, the Budget Balance result holds true on a per-
good basis, so it also holds for the total tax which is the sum of per-good taxes.
4. A mechanism for the public goods problem
For the purpose of maintaining clarity in the exposition, the presented mechanism below is
for the special case of a single feature in the public good i.e., P = 1. A natural extension to
the general case is discussed at the end of this section.
For any agent i 2 N, the message space is M
i
= R
N+1 . The message m
i
= (y
i
; q
i
)
consists of agent i’s contribution y
i
2 R to the common public good and a surrogate/proxy
q
i
=
 
q
1
i
; : : : ; q
N
i

2 R
N for the contributions of all the agents (including himself/herself).
The allocation function is defined as
bx
i
(m) =
1
N
0
B
B

y
i
+
X
r2N(i)
q
r
r

+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
q
r
n(i;r)

d(i;r) 1
1
C
C
A
; 8 i 2 N: (21)
The tax function is
b
t
i
(m) = bp
i
(m
 i
)bx
i
(m) +
 
q
i
i
  y
i

2
+
X
r2N(i)
(q
r
i
  y
r
)
2
+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
 
q
r
i
  q
r
n(i;r)

2
;
+
Æ
2
 
q
i
n(i;i)
  y
i

2
(22a)
bp
i
(m
 i
) = Æ(N   1)
0
B
B

q
i
n(i;i)

 
1
N   1
X
r2N(i)
q
r
r

 
1
N   1
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
q
r
n(i;r)

d(i;r) 1
1
C
C
A
; 8 i 2 N; (22b)
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where n(i; i) 2 N(i) is an arbitrarily chosen neighbor of i and  2 (0; 1), Æ > 0 are appropri-
ately chosen parameters and their selection is discussed in Section 5 on Learning Guarantees,
proof of Proposition 4.
In the following, denote the induced game by G
pub
and define the utility in the game, (9),
and the best-response, (15), as in the previous section.
4.1. Results
Fact 2 (Distributed). The mechanism defined in (21) and (22) is distributed.
The optimality conditions in (7) require that agents have global consensus on two aspects:
allocation must be the same for all and sum of prices should be equal to zero. As in the private
goods mechanism, we design the second, third and fourth tax terms in (22a) such that agents
are incentivized to duplicate global demand y onto locally available variables q
i
. To motivate
the allocation function and the remaining part of the tax function consider the case of  = 1
and take into account the duplication q
r
= y, 8 r 2 N. In this case all the factors involving 
in (21) and (22) are 1. The allocation function bx
i
(m) depends on y
i
; (q
r
)
r2N(i)
and is designed
such that after taking into account the duplication it is proportional to
P
j
y
j
. This facilitates
the first consensus - all agents’ allocation must be the same. The price bp
i
(m
 i
) is designed
such that it depends only on (q
r
)
r2N(i)
and after taking into account the duplication it is
proportional to y
i
 
1
N 1
P
j 6=i
y
j
. This facilitates the second consensus - sum of prices over
all agents is zero.
With the above design principles, all the results of this section follow. We then introduce
an additional fifth term in the tax, (22a), just for the purpose of achieving contraction in
Section 5 (see proof of Proposition 4). Incentives provided by this term are in line with those
already provided to the neighboring agent n(i; i) through his/her third tax term, hence it
doesn’t interfere with the equilibrium results in this section. Only the proof of concavity
changes slightly.
Finally, we set  < 1 and adjust everything in the allocation and tax function correspond-
ingly so that the game G
pub
can be contractive (see Section 5).
For the next two results, the basic idea behind the proofs are similar to the corresponding
results from the previous section.
Lemma 2 (Concavity). For any agent i 2 N and m
 i
2 M
 i
, the utility u
i
(m) for the
game G
pub
is strictly concave in m
i
= (y
i
; q
i
). Thus, the best-response of agent i is
unique and is defined by the first order conditions.
Proof. Please see Appendix C. 
Proposition 2 (Full Implementation and Budget Balance). For the game G
pub
, there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium, em 2M, and the allocation at Nash equilibrium is efficient,
11
i.e., bx( em) = x. Further, the total tax paid at Nash equilibrium em is zero, i.e.,
X
i2N
b
t
i
( em) = 0: (23)
Proof. Please see Appendix D. 
Generalizing to multiple features (P > 1)
With an idea similar to the extension for the private goods mechanism, extend the presented
mechanism by first increasing the message space such that for each agent m
i
=
 
m
p
i

p2P
=
(y
i
; q
i
). The allocation in this case is P dimensional and the expression for bxp
i
(m) is the
same as in the presented mechanism with y
i
;
 
q
r

r2N(i)
replaced by yp
i
;
 
q
p
r

r2N(i)
. The tax
function is
b
t
i
(m) =
X
p2P
b
t
p
i
(m); (24)
where the expression for bt
p
i
is the same as in the presented mechanism, replacing m by mk.
The results above follow using analogous arguments to those mentioned in the previous
section regarding generalization to multiple goods, K > 1.
5. Learning Guarantees
This section provides the result for guaranteed convergence for a class of learning algorithms,
when the mechanisms defined in Sections 3 and 4 are played repeatedly. As discussed in the
Introduction, such results act as a measure of robustness of a mechanism, w.r.t. information
available to agents, and thus makes the mechanism ready for practical applications.
A learning dynamic is represented by
(
n
)
n1
 
i2N
(M
i
); (25)
where 
n
is a mixed strategy profile with product structure to be used at time n. Denote
by S(
n
)  M the support of the mixed strategy profile 
n
and denote by m
n
2 S(
n
)
the realized action. Healy and Mathevet in [24] define the Adaptive Best-Response (ABR)
dynamics class by restricting the support S(
n
) in terms of past observed actions. Define the
history H
n
0
;n
= (m
n
0
;m
n
0
+1
; : : : ;m
n 1
) as the set of observed actions between n0 and n  1.
Denote by em the unique Nash equilibrium of the game and define B (M0) as the smallest
closed ball centered at em that contains the set M0 M. The closed ball is defined with any
valid metric d on the message space M.
A learning dynamic is in the ABR class if any point in the support of the action at time
n is no further from the Nash equilibrium than the best-response to any action that is no
further from Nash equilibrium than the “worst-case” action that has been observed in some
finite past fn0; : : : ; n  1g.
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Definition 1 (Adaptive Best-Response Learning Class [24]). A learning dynamic is an
adaptive best-response dynamic if 8 n0; 9 bn > n0; s.t. 8 n  bn,
S(
n
)  B ( (B (H
n
0
;n
))) ; (26)
where  : M!M is the best-response of the game.
The above is satisfied for instance if every agent puts belief zero over actions further from
Nash equilibrium than the ones that he/she has observed in the past. Some well-known
learning dynamics are in the ABR class, following are a few examples.
Cournot best-response is defined as S(
n
) = m
n
= (m
n 1
), i.e., at every time agents best-
respond to the last round’s action. This gives rise to a deterministic strategy at each time.
More generally, k period best-response is defined as the learning dynamic where at any time
n, an agent i’s strategy is a best-response to the mixed strategy of agents j 6= i which are
created using the observed empirical distribution from the actions of the previous k rounds
i.e., fm
j;n k
; : : : ;m
j;n 1
g. In fact, the generalization of this is also in the ABR class, where
at each time n, an agent i’s strategy is the best-response to the mixed strategy of agents
j 6= i that is formed by taking any convex combination of the empirical distributions of
actions observed in the previous k rounds. Finally, Fictitious Play [27, 20], which maintains
empirical distribution of all the past actions (instead of k most recent ones) is also in ABR.
The additional requirement for this is that the utility in the game should be strictly concave,
which is true for the presented mechanisms (see Lemmas 1 and 2).
Definition 2 (Contractive Mechanism). Let d be any metric defined on the message space
M such that (M; d) is a complete metric space. A mechanism is called contractive if for
any profile of utility function
 
v
i
()

i2N
that satisfy the assumptions of the model, the
induced game G
pvt
or G
pub
(depending on the allocation problem) has a single-valued
best-response function  : M!M that is a d contraction mapping.
A function h : M ! M is a d contraction mapping if kh(x)   h(y)k
d
< kx   yk
d
for
all distinct x; y 2 M. For the results below, the following well-known check for contraction
mapping is used: h is a contraction mapping (for some metric d) if the Jacobian has norm
less than one, i.e., krhk < 1, where any matrix norm can be considered. Specifically, we
consider the row-sum norm.
For the game induced by a contractive mechanism, by definition, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium. This is due to the Banach fixed-point theorem, which gives that the best-
response iteration for the induced game converges to a unique point. As shown in the
previous sections, the game G
pvt
and G
pub
already have a unique Nash equilibrium.
Fact 3 ([24, Theorem 1]). If a game is contractive, then all ABR dynamics converge to
the unique Nash equilibrium.
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The idea behind the above proof is to show that after a finite time, under any ABR
dynamic the distance to equilibrium gets smaller (exponentially) between successively rounds
due to the best-response being a contraction mapping. It is shown below that the presented
mechanism for both, the private and public goods problems, is contractive and thus owing to
the above result there is guaranteed convergence for all learning dynamics in the ABR class.
Contraction ensures convergence for the ABR class; this result is in the same vein as the
one in the seminal work [18]. Milgrom and Roberts show that Supermodularity ensures
convergence for the Adaptive Dynamics class of learning algorithms (also defined in [18]).
Supermodularity requires that the best-response of any agent i is non-decreasing in the
message m
j
of any other agent j 6= i. The aim in this paper is to get guarantees for the ABR
class, however it is shown below that the game G
pvt
induced by the private goods mechanism
is also supermodular and thus has guaranteed convergence for the Adaptive Dynamics class
as well.
Before proceeding, kindly note that contraction is somewhat more stringent a condition
that supermodularity and consequently the ABR class is broader than the adaptive dynamics
class. Thus in order to have better learning guarantees, our principle aim to ensure the
property of contraction.
5.1. Results
Proposition 3 (Contraction). The game G
pvt
defined in Section 3.2 is contractive but not
supermodular. Thus, all learning dynamics within the ABR dynamics class converge
to the unique efficient Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Please see Appendix E. 
The intuition behind the proof of Proposition 3 can be motivated as follows. By selecting
parameter  < 1, contraction of best-response for the variables (~qr
i
)
r 6=i
is already ensured.
However, for best-response in ~y
i
; ~q
i
i
, tuning of ; Æ is needed. Due to the specific nature of the
mechanism it turns out that in order to accommodate any given value of  > 1,  needs to
be selected close to 1 and correspondingly Æ needs to be selected as a function of the chosen
. Finally, it is also shown that the best-response ~y
i
and ~qi
i
are decreasing in qi
n(i;i)
and hence
the game is not supermodular.
Generalizing to K > 1 The proof of Proposition 3 relies on inverting v0
i
: R ! R and
bounding it appropriately. For the general case this is the same as inverting rv
i
: R
K
! R
K .
Strict concavity of v
i
() ensures that the determinant of Hessian of v
i
is never zero, hence
an inverse for rv
i
exists in the general case. Of course, to bound the derivatives of (rv
i
)
 1,
instead of using the condition in (2) we use the more general condition from (1). Finally, the
proof is completed by tuning the parameters ; Æ in exactly the same manner as in the proof
of Proposition 3.
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Proposition 4 (Contraction). The game G
pub
defined in Section 4 is both contractive and
supermodular. Thus, all learning dynamics within the ABR dynamics class converge
to the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Please see Appendix F. 
Initially the parameters have the following bound:  2 (0; 1) and Æ > 0. In order to get
contraction, a further restriction  2

p
(N   1)/N ; 1

needs to be imposed. This also gives
that each best-response is non-decreasing in the message of every other agent and thus the
game is supermodular. Finally, here too in order to accommodate any value of  > 1 the
final tuning of  requires it to be chosen very close to 1 and consequently Æ is selected as a
function of the chosen .
Generalizing to P > 1, the essential idea of inverting rv
i
from above works here too and
from there onwards the steps follow analogously to the ones in the proof above.
5.2. Numerical Analysis of convergence
For numerical analysis we consider the private goods problem with one good (K = 1) and
the public goods problem with one feature (P = 1) and N = 31,  = 25. The agents’ utility
function as quadratic, i.e.,
v
i
(x
i
) = 
i
x
2
i
+ 
i
x
i
; (Private)
v
i
(x) = 
i
x
2
+ 
i
x: (Public)
An example of quadratic utility function can be found in [28], for the model of demand
side management in smart-grids. In each case the second derivative of v
i
() is 2
i
and thus
for any agent i the value for 
i
is chosen uniformly randomly in the range ( 
2
; 
1
2
). As
the model doesn’t impose any restriction on the first derivative, the value for 
i
is chosen
uniformly randomly in the range (10; 20). From the proof of Propositions 3 and 4, one can
numerically calculate the value of parameters ; Æ. For the particular instance of the random
;  generated to be used for the plots below (the same values for ;  are used for both public
and private goods examples), the parameter values are listed in Table 1. The two cases for
graph G considered are: a full binary tree and a sample of the Erdős-Reńyi random graph
with only one connected component, where any two edges are connected with probability
p = 0:3. The first represents a case of small average degree whereas the second represents
the case of large average degree. The same instance of Erdős-Reńyi random graph is used
for both private and public goods examples.
Since it has been shown that the best-response is a contraction mapping, one expects that
any learning strategy that best-responds to some convex combination of past actions from
finitely many rounds, converges at an exponential rate. Indeed, this is exactly observed from
Fig. 2 and 5, where the absolute distance km
n
  emk
2
of the action in round n to the Nash
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Private goods Public goods
Binary Tree
 = 1  (1:831 10
 4
),
Æ = 1005:6.
 = 1  (2:515 10
 4
),
Æ = 0:9505.
Erdős-Reńyi
 = 1  (7:324 10
 4
),
Æ = 932:3.
 = 1  (10
 3
),
Æ = 0:8744.
Table 1: (; Æ) parameter values for different graphs and problems.
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Figure 2: km
n
  emk
2
vs. n for the private goods mechanism.
equilibrium em of the game G
pvt
and G
pub
is plotted versus n, respectively. For the learning
dynamic1, one case considered is when the action taken by any agent i at time n is the
best-response to an exponentially weighed average of past actions, i.e.,
m
n
= 

m
n 1
2
+
r
n 1
2

; (27a)
r
n
=
m
n
2
+
r
n 1
2
: (27b)
The second learning dynamic is to best-respond to the average of past 10 rounds.
Since the learning iterations are essentially conducting information exchange, one expects
that the convergence to be faster for a graph that is more connected. From both the figures
this is evident, as for each learning dynamic higher average degree Erdős-Reńyi random graph
shows faster convergence than lower average degree Binary Tree. In fact, for both learning
dynamics the convergence for the Erdős-Reńyi random graph is faster than either learning
1A theoretical simplification with quadratic utilities v
i
() is that for learning strategies such as k period
best-response or Fictitious Play, instead of maintaining the empirical distribution over other agents’ past
actions, every agent can simply maintain the empirical average.
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dynamic for Binary Tree. Comparing the two learning dynamics among themselves, we
observe that the more aggressive exponential weighing leads to faster convergence compared
to the learning dynamic that puts equal weight on each of the previous 10 actions. Finally, for
Fig. 2, in each case the relative distance to Nash equilibrium, defined as km
n
  emk
2
/k emk
1
,
is in the order of 10 9 when the absolute distance to Nash equilibrium is 10 3. For Fig. 5,
the relative distance in each case is of the order of 10 8 when the absolute distance to Nash
equilibrium is 10 5.
Fig. 3 and 4 refer to the private goods mechanism and plot the distance of allocation
bx(m
n
) and price (p
1
(m
n
); : : : ; p
N
(m
n
)) in round n to x and (
1
; : : : ; 

1
), respectively. The
convergence pattern is the same as the one observed in Fig. 2, for the distance of message
m
n
to Nash equilibrium em.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a distributed mechanism where agents only need to exchange
messages locally with their neighbors. While for models with non-strategic agents, extensive
research has been done in the field of distributed learning and optimization, this is not the case
with mechanism design where agents are fully strategic. For every profile (v
i
())
i2N
of utility
functions, the induced game is shown to have a unique NE. The allocation at equilibrium is
efficient and taxes are budget balanced. Then we establish informational robustness of the
mechanism by showing that the best-response in the induced game is a contraction mapping.
This establishes that every learning dynamic within the ABR dynamics class converges to
the unique and efficient NE when the game is played repeatedly. The ABR class contains
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learning dynamics such as Cournot best-response, k period best-response and Fictitious
Play.
Future Work
A significant scope for improvement in the presented mechanism is the reduction of the size of
the message space. A more scalable mechanism would be one where on average each agent’s
message space is of dimension o(N). However, such an attempt might possibly require
restrictions on either the underlying graph G or the upper bound on  that is admissible
under the model. For the presented mechanism, the only restriction on the graph is that
it is connected and there is no upper bound on . Another improvement can be that of
considering more complicated constraint sets for the optimization (4). However, as can be
seen from previous attempts at mechanism design for general constraint sets, [7, 8, 9, 11, 29],
such an extension is not straightforward. Finally, for preventing inter-temporal exchange of
money during the learning phase, one can adjust taxes such that there is budget balance for
all messages, rather than just at NE.
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A. Proof of Lemma 1 (Concavity - Private goods)
Proof. Since the allocation and tax functions are smooth and v
i
() is continuously double-
differentiable, to establish concavity we show that the Hessian of u
i
(m) w.r.t. m
i
is negative
definite i.e., H  0. Once this is established, the optimization in (15) has a strictly concave
objective and an unbounded constraint set. Thus it has a unique maximizer, defined by the
first order derivative conditions.
The Hessian is of size (N + 1) (N + 1) and we have
H
11
=

2
u
i
(m)
y
2
i
= v
00
i
(bx
i
(m))  2
2
; (28a)
H
(j+1)1
= H
1(j+1)
=

2
u
i
(m)
y
i
q
j
i
=
(
0 for j 2 N; j 6= i;
2 for j = i;
(28b)
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H(j+1)(j+1)
=

2
u
i
(m)
(q
j
i
)
2
=  2; 8 j 2 N; (28c)
H
(r+1)(j+1)
=

2
u
i
(m)
q
r
i
q
j
i
= 0; 8 j; r 2 N; j 6= r: (28d)
The characteristic equation, Det (H   xI) = 0, becomes
(x+ 2)
N 1

(x+ 2)(x H
11
)  4
2

= 0: (29)
This implies that N   1 eigenvalues of H are  2 and the remaining two eigenvalues satisfy
x
2
+ (2   H
11
)x   2v
00
i
(bx
i
(m)) = 0. Since H is a symmetric matrix, all its eigenvalues are
real. Due to v00
i
() < 0, the product of roots in the above quadratic equation is positive and
the sum of roots is negative. This gives that the remaining two eigenvalues of H are also
negative. 
B. Proof of Proposition 1 (Full Implementation - Private goods)
Proof. For the private goods problem in (4), the optimality conditions in (5) are sufficient.
Thus in order to prove that the corresponding allocation at Nash equilibrium is efficient,
we show that at any Nash equilibrium m = (y; q) 2 M, the allocation
 
bx
i
(m)

i2N
and
prices
 
bp
i
(m)

i2N
satisfy the optimality conditions as x and 
1
, respectively. Then using an
invertibility argument we show existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
Using Proposition 1, at any Nash equilibrium m we have: r
m
i
u
i
(m) = 0, 8 i 2 N. This
gives
v
i
(bx
i
(m))
y
i
 

b
t
i
(m)
y
i
= 0; 8 i 2 N; (30a)
v
i
(bx
i
(m))
q
r
i
 

b
t
i
(m)
q
r
i
= 0; 8 r 2 N; i 2 N: (30b)
Using the definitions in (13) and (14), this becomes
v
0
i
(bx
i
(m))  bp
i
(m
 i
) + 2(q
i
i
  y
i
) = 0; 8 i 2 N; (31a)
q
r
i
=
8
>
<
>
:
y
i
for r = i;
y
r
for r 2 N(i);
q
r
n(i;r)
for r =2 N(i) and r 6= i;
8 i 2 N: (31b)
For any distinct pair of vertexes i; r, denote by fi; i
1
; i
2
; : : : ; i
d(i;r)
= rg the ordered vertexes
in the shortest path between i and r, where i
1
= n(i; r) 2 N(i). Since the shortest path
between i and r contains the shortest path between i
k
and r, for any k < d(i; r), we have
n(i
k
; r) = i
k+1
. Using the third sub-equation in (31b) repeatedly, replacing i by i
k
gives,
q
r
i
=  q
r
i
1
= 
2
q
r
i
2
=    = 
d(i;r) 1
q
r
i
d(i;r) 1
: (32)
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Now using the second sub-equation of (31b), replacing i by i
d(i;r) 1
and noting r 2 N(i
d(i;r) 1
),
gives qr
i
d(i;r) 1
=  y
r
. This combined with the above equation gives that (31b) implies
q
r
i
=
(
y
i
for r = i;

d(i;r)
y
r
for r 6= i;
8 i 2 N: (33)
Using the above and then combining (31a) with (13) and (14b) gives, 8 i 2 N,
v
0
i
(bx
i
(m)) = bp
i
(m
 i
); (34a)
bx
i
(m) = y
i
 
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
y
j
; (34b)
bp
i
(m
 i
) =
1
Æ
X
j2N
y
j
: (34c)
(34b) implies
P
i2N
bx
i
(m) = 0 and combining (34a) and (34c) gives v0
i
(bx
i
(m)) =
1
Æ
P
j2N
y
j
,
8 i 2 N. Thus, the allocation-price pair
 
 
y
i
 
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
y
j

i2N
;
1
Æ
X
j2N
y
j
!
(35)
satisfy the optimality conditions, (5), as (x; 
1
). Since the optimality conditions are suffi-
cient, the allocation at any Nash equilibrium m is the efficient allocation x.
For existence and uniqueness, consider the following set of linear equations that must be
satisfied at any Nash equilibrium m,
x

i
= y
i
 
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
y
j
; 8 i 2 N; (36a)


1
=
1
Æ
X
j2N
y
j
: (36b)
Here
 
y
j

j2N
are the variables and (x; 
1
) are fixed - since they are uniquely defined by the
optimization (4). The above equations can be inverted to give the unique solution as,
y
i
=
N   1
N
x

i
+
Æ

1
N
; 8 i 2 N: (37)
Furthermore, using above and (33), the values for
 
q
r
i

i;r2N
can also be calculated uniquely.
Since a solution for m = (y; q) in terms of x; 
1
exists, existence of Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed. Also, since this solution is unique, there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
For Budget Balance, we have the following. From the above characterization, at Nash Equi-
librium em all tax terms from (14a), other than bp
i
( em
 i
)

bx
i
( em) 

1
N

, are zero. Furthermore,
the prices are all equal to 
1
and allocations are equal to x
i
. Thus,
X
i2N
b
t
i
( em) =
X
i2N


1

bx
i
( em) 

1
N

= 

1
 
X
i2N
x

i
  
1
!
= 

1
 0 = 0; (38)
since the efficient allocation x satisfies the constraint
P
i2N
x

i
= 
1
. 
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C. Proof of Lemma 2 (Concavity - Public Goods)
Proof. Since the allocation and tax functions are smooth and v
i
() is continuously double-
differentiable, to establish concavity we show that the Hessian of u
i
(m) w.r.t. m
i
is negative
definite i.e., H  0. Once this is established, the optimization in (15) has a strictly concave
objective and an unbounded constraint set. Thus it has a unique maximizer, defined by the
first order derivative conditions.
The Hessian is of size (N + 1) (N + 1) and we have
H
11
=

2
u
i
(m)
y
2
i
=
v
00
i
(bx
i
(m))
N
2
  (2 + Æ)
2
; (39a)
H
(j+1)1
= H
1(j+1)
=

2
u
i
(m)
y
i
q
j
i
=
(
0 for j 2 N; j 6= i;
2 for j = i;
(39b)
H
(j+1)(j+1)
=

2
u
i
(m)
(q
j
i
)
2
=  2; 8 j 2 N; (39c)
H
(r+1)(j+1)
=

2
u
i
(m)
q
r
i
q
j
i
= 0; 8 j; r 2 N; j 6= r: (39d)
The characteristic equation, Det (H   xI) = 0, becomes
(x+ 2)
N 1

(x+ 2)(x H
11
)  4
2

= 0: (40)
This implies that N   1 eigenvalues of H are  2 and the remaining two eigenvalues satisfy
x
2
+(2 H
11
)x+2Æ
2
 
2
N
2
v
00
i
(bx
i
(m)) = 0. Since H is a symmetric matrix, all its eigenvalues
are real. Due to v00
i
() < 0, the product of roots in the above quadratic equation is positive
and the sum of roots is negative. This gives that the remaining two eigenvalues of H are also
negative. 
D. Proof of Proposition 2 (Full Implementation - Public goods)
Proof. For the public goods problem in (6), the optimality conditions in (7) are sufficient.
Thus in order to prove that the corresponding allocation at Nash equilibrium is efficient, we
show that at any Nash equilibrium m = (y; q) 2 M, the allocation
 
bx
i
(m)

i2N
and prices
 
bp
i
(m)

i2N
satisfy the optimality conditions as x and 1

, respectively. Then using an
invertibility argument we show existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
Using Proposition 2, at any Nash equilibrium m we have: r
m
i
u
i
(m) = 0, 8 i 2 N. This
gives
v
i
(bx
i
(m))
y
i
 

b
t
i
(m)
y
i
= 0; 8 i 2 N; (41a)
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v
i
(bx
i
(m))
q
r
i
 

b
t
i
(m)
q
r
i
= 0; 8 r 2 N; i 2 N: (41b)
Using the definitions in (21) and (22), this becomes, 8 i 2 N,
1
N
 
v
0
i
(bx
i
(m))  bp
i
(m
 i
)

+ 2(q
i
i
  y
i
) + Æ(q
i
n(i;i)
  y
i
) = 0; (42a)
q
r
i
=
8
>
<
>
:
y
i
for r = i;
y
r
for r 2 N(i);
q
r
n(i;r)
for r =2 N(i) and r 6= i;
: (42b)
For any distinct pair of vertexes i; r, denote by fi; i
1
; i
2
; : : : ; i
d(i;r)
= rg the ordered vertexes
in the shortest path between i and r, where i
1
= n(i; r) 2 N(i). Since the shortest path
between i and r contains the shortest path between i
k
and r, for any k < d(i; r), we have
n(i
k
; r) = i
k+1
. Using the third sub-equation in (42b) repeatedly, replacing i by i
k
gives,
q
r
i
=  q
r
i
1
= 
2
q
r
i
2
=    = 
d(i;r) 1
q
r
i
d(i;r) 1
: (43)
Now using the second sub-equation of (42b), replacing i by i
d(i;r) 1
and noting r 2 N(i
d(i;r) 1
),
gives qr
i
d(i;r) 1
=  y
r
. This combined with the above equation gives that (42b) implies
q
r
i
=
(
y
i
for r = i;

d(i;r)
y
r
for r 6= i;
8 i 2 N: (44)
Using the above and then combining (42a) with (21) and (22b) gives, 8 i 2 N,
v
0
i
(bx
i
(m)) = bp
i
(m
 i
); (45a)
bx
i
(m) =
1
N
X
j2N
y
j
; (45b)
bp
i
(m
 i
) = Æ(N   1)
 
y
i
 
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
y
j
!
: (45c)
(45b) implies bx
i
(m) = bx
r
(m) for any i; r 2 N and (45c) gives
P
r2N
bp
i
(m
 i
) = 0. Thus, the
allocation-price pair
0

1
N
X
j2N
y
j
;
 
Æ(N   1)
 
y
i
 
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
y
j
!!
i2N
1
A (46)
satisfy the optimality conditions, (7), as (x; 1

). Since the optimality conditions are suffi-
cient, the allocation at any Nash equilibrium m is the efficient allocation x.
For existence and uniqueness, consider the following set of linear equations that must be
satisfied at any Nash equilibrium m,
x

=
1
N
X
j2N
y
j
; (47a)
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1
i

= Æ(N   1)
 
y
i
 
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
y
j
!
; 8 i 2 N: (47b)
Here
 
y
j

j2N
are the variables and (x; 1

) are fixed - since they are uniquely defined by the
optimization, (6). The above equations can be inverted to give the unique solution as,
y
i
= x

+

1
i

ÆN
; 8 i 2 N: (48)
Furthermore, using above and (44), the values for
 
q
r
i

i;r2N
can also be calculated uniquely.
Since a solution for m = (y; q) in terms of x; 1

exists, existence of Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed. Also, since this solution is unique, there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
For Budget Balance, we have the following. By the characterization from above we know
that at Nash Equilibrium em, all tax terms from (22a), other than bp
i
( em
 i
)bx
i
( em), are zero.
Furthermore, the prices are equal to 1
i

and each allocation is equal to x. Thus,
X
i2N
b
t
i
( em) =
X
i2N

1
i

x

= x

X
i2N

1
i

= x

 0 = 0; (49)
since the optimal dual variables
 

1
i


i2N
satisfy, (7b),
P
i2N

1
i

= 0. 
E. Proof of Proposition 3 (Contraction - Private goods)
Proof. The game is contractive if the matrix norm of the Jacobian of best-response  =
 

i

i2N
=
 
~y
i
; ~q
i

i2N
is smaller than unity, i.e., krk < 1. We use the row-sum norm for this,
and in this proof verify specifically the following set of conditions,
X
r2N; r 6=i
 




~y
i
y
r




+
X
j2N




~y
i
q
j
r




!
< 1; 8 i 2 N; (50a)
X
r2N; r 6=i
 




~q
w
i
y
r




+
X
j2N




~q
w
i
q
j
r




!
< 1; 8 w 2 N; 8 i 2 N: (50b)
The summation can be performed simply over the indexes r 2 N(i) instead of r 6= i because
our defined mechanism is distributed and hence the best-response of agent i depends only
on
 
m
j

j2N(i)
.
Consider any agent i 2 N, for the best-response ~q
i
we have
~q
w
i
=
8
>
<
>
:
~y
i
for w = i;
y
w
for w 2 N(i);
q
w
n(i;w)
for w =2 N(i) and w 6= i:
(51)
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Thus, by choosing  2 (0; 1), all conditions within (50b) are satisfied where w 6= i. Next,
we verify conditions in (50a). Once this is done, then in conjunction with  2 (0; 1), the
conditions from (50b) with w = i are also automatically verified.
For the best-response ~y
i
, we have
~y
i
=
1
N   1
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
q
r
n(i;r)

d(i;r) 1
+
1
N   1
X
r2N(i)
q
r
r

+ (v
0
i
)
 1
 
bp
i
(m
 i
)

: (52)
where bp
i
(m
 i
) is defined in (14b). Thus, we have,
~y
i
q
r
n(i;r)
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
1
Æ
1
v
00
i
()
for r = i;
1
N   1
1

+
1
Æ
1
v
00
i
()
for r 2 N(i);
1
N   1
1

d(i;r) 1
+
1
Æ
d(i;r) 1
1
v
00
i
()
for r =2 N(i); r 6= i:
(53)
where in each expression above v00
i
() is evaluated at bp
i
(m
 i
). Also, in the notation used
above, for any r 2 N(i), n(i; r) = r. All other partial derivative of ~y
i
are zero. With all this
condition in (50a) becomes,




1
Æ
1
v
00
i
()




+




1 +
N   1
Æv
00
i
()




0

X
r2N(i)
1
(N   1)
1
A
+




1 +
N   1
Æv
00
i
()




 
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1
(N   1)
d(i;r) 1
!
< 1:
(54)
To simplify the above, we utilize the upper bound from (2), v00
i
() 2 ( ; 
1

). Set
 <
Æ
N   1
; (55)
so that the expressions inside absolute value operator for the second and third terms on the
LHS in (54) are guaranteed to be positive. With this, (54) becomes

 1
v
00
i
()

0
B
B

1

 
X
r2N(i)
1

 
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1

d(i;r) 1
1
C
C
A
<
Æ
N   1
0
B
B

N   1 
2
6
6
4
X
r2N(i)
1

+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1

d(i;r) 1
3
7
7
5
1
C
C
A
(56)
Since any agent has at least one neighbor i.e., jN(i)j  1, the LHS above is negative. For the
RHS, note that the expression inside the square brackets has exactly N   1 terms and each
term is of the form  k, for some k  1. Since  < 1, this gives that even the RHS is negative.
Utilizing the lower bound from (2), a sufficient condition to verify (56) is  < N 1
Æ



C
i
D
i



, where
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Ci
; D
i
are the expression inside the curved bracket on the LHS and RHS of (56), respectively.
Combining this with the condition in (55), a sufficient condition for verifying (50a) is
 < min

Æ
N   1
;
N   1
Æ




C
i
D
i





; 8 i 2 N: (57)
Without any further tuning of parameters ; Æ, the proof is complete as long as  satisfies
above. However, in our model we would like to accommodate any value of  > 1 and this
requires tuning of parameters ; Æ. Set
Æ = (N   1)
s
min
i2N




C
i
D
i




> 0; (58)
in this to get the sufficient condition as 2 < min
i2N




C
i
D
i




, i.e.,

2
< min
i2N
8
>
>
<
>
:








1

 
X
r2N(i)
1

 
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1

d(i;r) 1








,








N   1 
2
6
6
4
X
r2N(i)
1

+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1

d(i;r) 1
3
7
7
5








9
>
>
=
>
;
: (59)
We want to select  2 (0; 1) such that the RHS above can be made arbitrarily large. For
this, first note that, for any i 2 N the numerator of the RHS is bounded away from zero for
 in the neighborhood of 1. Second, the denominator can be made arbitrarily close to 0 by
choosing  close enough to 1. This can be seen by rewriting
D
i
= N   1 
2
6
6
4
X
r2N(i)
1

+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1

d(i;r) 1
3
7
7
5
=
X
r2N(i)

1 
1


+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i

1 
1

d(i;r) 1

; (60)
where for any given k  1;  > 0, choose  2

 
1
1+

1
=k
; 1

to have j1   kj < . Finally, it is
clear from above that the denominator D
i
can be made arbitrarily small concurrently for all
i 2 N.
That the game is not supermodular follows from the first sub-equation of (53), which
implies that the best-response ~y
i
is decreasing w.r.t. qi
n(i;i)
. Also, convergence of every
learning dynamic within the ABR class is guaranteed by Fact 3. 
F. Proof of Proposition 4 (Contraction - Public goods)
Proof. The game is contractive if the matrix norm of the Jacobian of best-response  =
 

i

i2N
=
 
~y
i
; ~q
i

i2N
is smaller than unity, i.e., krk < 1. We use the row-sum norm for this,
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and in this proof verify specifically the following set of conditions,
X
r2N; r 6=i
 




~y
i
y
r




+
X
j2N




~y
i
q
j
r




!
< 1; 8 i 2 N; (61a)
X
r2N; r 6=i
 




~q
w
i
y
r




+
X
j2N




~q
w
i
q
j
r




!
< 1; 8 w 2 N; 8 i 2 N: (61b)
The summation can be performed simply over the indexes r 2 N(i) instead of r 6= i because
our defined mechanism is distributed and hence the best-response of agent i depends only
on
 
m
j

j2N(i)
.
Consider any agent i 2 N, for the best-response ~q
i
we have
~q
w
i
=
8
>
<
>
:
~y
i
for w = i;
y
w
for w 2 N(i);
q
w
n(i;w)
for w =2 N(i) and w 6= i:
(62)
Thus, by choosing  2 (0; 1), all conditions within (61b) are satisfied where w 6= i. Next,
we verify conditions in (61a). Once this is done, then in conjunction with  2 (0; 1), the
conditions from (61b) with w = i are also automatically verified.
For the best-response ~y
i
, we have the following relation
1
N
 
v
0
i
(bx
i
(m))  bp
i
(m
 i
)

+ 2(~q
i
i
  ~y
i
) + Æ(q
i
n(i;i)
  ~y
i
) = 0; (63a)
)
1
N
 
v
0
i
(bx
i
(m))  bp
i
(m
 i
)

+ Æ(q
i
n(i;i)
  ~y
i
) = 0: (63b)
In the above relation, bx
i
(m) is evaluated at ~y
i
instead of y
i
. Also, this relation implicitly
defines ~y
i
. Differentiating this equation w.r.t.
 
q
r
n(i;r)

r2N
gives
v
00
i
(bx
i
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2
~y
i
q
r
n(i;i)
 
Æ(N   1)
N
+ Æ
 
1  
~y
i
q
r
n(i;i)
!
= 0; r = i; (64a)
v
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i
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i
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N
2
 
~y
i
q
r
n(i;r)
+
1

!
+
Æ
N
  Æ
2
~y
i
q
r
n(i;r)
= 0; 8 r 2 N(i); (64b)
v
00
i
(bx
i
(m))
N
2
 
~y
i
q
r
n(i;r)
+
1

d(i;r) 1
!
+
Æ
N
d(i;r) 1
  Æ
2
~y
i
q
r
n(i;r)
= 0; 8 r =2 N(i); r 6= i; (64c)
which implies
~y
i
q
r
n(i;r)
=
1
v
00
i
(bx
i
(m))
N
2
  Æ
2

8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
Æ(N   1)
N
  Æ for r = i;
 
Æ
N
 
v
00
i
(bx
i
(m))
N
2

for r 2 N(i);
 
Æ
N
d(i;r) 1
 
v
00
i
(bx
i
(m))
N
2

d(i;r) 1
for r =2 N(i); r 6= i:
(65)
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In the notation used above, for any r 2 N(i), n(i; r) = r. All other partial derivative of ~y
i
are zero. With all this condition in (61a) becomes,




Æ(N   1)
N
  Æ
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 
Æ
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 
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X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
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
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!
< Æ
2
 
v
00
i
(bx
i
(m))
N
2
: (66)
We impose the condition
 2
 
r
N   1
N
; 1
!
(67)
so that the expression inside the first absolute value term in above is negative. To simplify
the other expressions containing absolute value, we utilize the lower bound from (2), v00
i
() 2
( ; 
1

). Set
 < NÆ; (68)
so that the remaining expressions inside absolute value in (66) are guaranteed to be negative.
With this, (66) becomes
h
  v
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i
(bx
i
(m))
i
0
B
B

1 +
X
r2N(i)
1

+
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1

d(i;r) 1
1
C
C
A
> NÆ
0
B
B

1

2
6
6
4
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1

d(i;r) 2
  (N   jN(i)j   1)
3
7
7
5
+N(1  )
1
C
C
A
; (69)
where N   jN(i)j   1 is the number of agents in the system except agent i and all his/her
neighbors in N(i). Clearly the LHS above is positive. For any r 2 N(i) and r 6= i, we have
d(i; r)  2. On the RHS, inside the square brackets there are exactly N   jN(i)j   1 terms
in the summation and each term is of the form  k, for some k  0. Since  < 1, this gives
that even the RHS is positive. Utilizing the upper bound from (2), a sufficient condition to
verify (69) is  <
1
NÆ
C
i
D
i
, where C
i
; D
i
are the expression inside the curved bracket on the
LHS and RHS of (69), respectively. Combining this with the condition in (68), a sufficient
condition for verifying (61a) is
 < min

NÆ ;
1
NÆ
C
i
D
i

; 8 i 2 N: (70)
Without any further tuning of parameters ; Æ, the proof is complete as long as  satisfies
above. However, in our model we would like to accommodate any value of  > 1 and this
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requires tuning of parameters ; Æ. Set
Æ =
1
N
s
min
i2N

C
i
D
i

> 0; (71)
in this to get the sufficient condition as 2 < min
i2N

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D
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
, i.e.,

2
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i2N
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A
,
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  (N   jN(i)j   1)
3
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+N(1  )
1
C
C
A
)
: (72)
We want to select  such that the RHS above can be made arbitrarily large, whilst satisfy-
ing (67). For this, firstly note that, for any i 2 N the numerator of the RHS is greater than
1, hence it is bounded away from zero. Secondly, the denominator can be made arbitrarily
close to 0 by choosing  close enough to 1. This can be seen by rewriting
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i
1

d(i;r) 2
  (N   jN(i)j   1) =
X
r=2N(i)
r 6=i

1

d(i;r) 2
  1

=
X
r2N
d(i;r)3

1

d(i;r) 2
  1

; (73a)
) D
i
=
1

X
r2N
d(i;r)3

1

d(i;r) 2
  1

+N(1  ); (73b)
where for any given k  1;  > 0, choose  2

 
1
1+

1
=k
; 1

to have
 

 k
  1

< . Note that
this is consistent with (67). The remaining term N(1  ) can also made made arbitrarily
small by choosing  close enough to 1. Finally, it is clear from above that the denominator
D
i
can made arbitrarily small concurrently for all i 2 N.
The fact that the game is supermodular follows from the preceding analysis, where the
parameters are chosen such that each expression in (65) is positive. Which implies that the
best-response is increasing in every message of other agents. 
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